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[3.9] pythongh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in …
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…`urlsplit` (pythonGH-102508) (pythonGH-104575) (pythonGH-104592) (python#104593)

pythongh-102153: Start stripping C0 control and space chars in `urlsplit` (pythonGH-102508)

`urllib.parse.urlsplit` has already been respecting the WHATWG spec a bit pythonGH-25595.

This adds more sanitizing to respect the "Remove any leading C0 control or space from input" [rule](https://url.spec.whatwg.org/GH-url-parsing:~:text=Remove%20any%20leading%20and%20trailing%20C0%20control%20or%20space%20from%20input.) in response to [CVE-2023-24329](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24329).

I simplified the docs by eliding the state of the world explanatory
paragraph in this security release only backport.  (people will see
that in the mainline /3/ docs)

(cherry picked from commit 2f630e1)
(cherry picked from commit 610cc0a)
(cherry picked from commit f48a96a)

Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith [Google] <greg@krypto.org>
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3 people authored May 22, 2023
1 parent 3d5dd1e commit d7f8a5f
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38 changes: 36 additions & 2 deletions Doc/library/urllib.parse.rst
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
ParseResult(scheme='http', netloc='www.cwi.nl:80', path='/%7Eguido/Python.html',
params='', query='', fragment='')

.. warning::

:func:`urlparse` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing
security <url-parsing-security>` for details.

.. versionchanged:: 3.2
Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -323,8 +327,14 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
decomposed before parsing, no error will be raised.

Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline
``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL.
Following some of the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, leading C0
control and space characters are stripped from the URL. ``\n``,
``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are removed from the URL at any position.

.. warning::

:func:`urlsplit` does not perform validation. See :ref:`URL parsing
security <url-parsing-security>` for details.

.. versionchanged:: 3.6
Out-of-range port numbers now raise :exc:`ValueError`, instead of
Expand All @@ -337,6 +347,9 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
.. versionchanged:: 3.9.5
ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL.

.. versionchanged:: 3.9.17
Leading WHATWG C0 control and space characters are stripped from the URL.

.. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser

.. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -413,6 +426,27 @@ or on combining URL components into a URL string.
or ``scheme://host/path``). If *url* is not a wrapped URL, it is returned
without changes.

.. _url-parsing-security:

URL parsing security
--------------------

The :func:`urlsplit` and :func:`urlparse` APIs do not perform **validation** of
inputs. They may not raise errors on inputs that other applications consider
invalid. They may also succeed on some inputs that might not be considered
URLs elsewhere. Their purpose is for practical functionality rather than
purity.

Instead of raising an exception on unusual input, they may instead return some
component parts as empty strings. Or components may contain more than perhaps
they should.

We recommend that users of these APIs where the values may be used anywhere
with security implications code defensively. Do some verification within your
code before trusting a returned component part. Does that ``scheme`` make
sense? Is that a sensible ``path``? Is there anything strange about that
``hostname``? etc.

.. _parsing-ascii-encoded-bytes:

Parsing ASCII Encoded Bytes
Expand Down
61 changes: 60 additions & 1 deletion Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -649,14 +649,73 @@ def test_urlsplit_remove_unsafe_bytes(self):
self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")

def test_urlsplit_strip_url(self):
noise = bytes(range(0, 0x20 + 1))
base_url = "http://User:Pass@www.python.org:080/doc/?query=yes#frag"

url = noise.decode("utf-8") + base_url
p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "User:Pass@www.python.org:080")
self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/")
self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=yes")
self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "frag")
self.assertEqual(p.username, "User")
self.assertEqual(p.password, "Pass")
self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org")
self.assertEqual(p.port, 80)
self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url)

url = noise + base_url.encode("utf-8")
p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http")
self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"User:Pass@www.python.org:080")
self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/doc/")
self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=yes")
self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"frag")
self.assertEqual(p.username, b"User")
self.assertEqual(p.password, b"Pass")
self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org")
self.assertEqual(p.port, 80)
self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), base_url.encode("utf-8"))

# Test that trailing space is preserved as some applications rely on
# this within query strings.
query_spaces_url = "https://www.python.org:88/doc/?query= "
p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(noise.decode("utf-8") + query_spaces_url)
self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org:88")
self.assertEqual(p.path, "/doc/")
self.assertEqual(p.query, "query= ")
self.assertEqual(p.port, 88)
self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), query_spaces_url)

p = urllib.parse.urlsplit("www.pypi.org ")
# That "hostname" gets considered a "path" due to the
# trailing space and our existing logic... YUCK...
# and re-assembles via geturl aka unurlsplit into the original.
# django.core.validators.URLValidator (at least through v3.2) relies on
# this, for better or worse, to catch it in a ValidationError via its
# regular expressions.
# Here we test the basic round trip concept of such a trailing space.
self.assertEqual(urllib.parse.urlunsplit(p), "www.pypi.org ")

# with scheme as cache-key
url = "//www.python.org/"
scheme = noise.decode("utf-8") + "https" + noise.decode("utf-8")
for _ in range(2):
p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme)
self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/")

def test_attributes_bad_port(self):
"""Check handling of invalid ports."""
for bytes in (False, True):
for parse in (urllib.parse.urlsplit, urllib.parse.urlparse):
for port in ("foo", "1.5", "-1", "0x10"):
with self.subTest(bytes=bytes, parse=parse, port=port):
netloc = "www.example.net:" + port
url = "http://" + netloc
url = "http://" + netloc + "/"
if bytes:
netloc = netloc.encode("ascii")
url = url.encode("ascii")
Expand Down
12 changes: 12 additions & 0 deletions Lib/urllib/parse.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
scenarios for parsing, and for backward compatibility purposes, some
parsing quirks from older RFCs are retained. The testcases in
test_urlparse.py provides a good indicator of parsing behavior.
The WHATWG URL Parser spec should also be considered. We are not compliant with
it either due to existing user code API behavior expectations (Hyrum's Law).
It serves as a useful guide when making changes.
"""

import re
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -78,6 +82,10 @@
'0123456789'
'+-.')

# Leading and trailing C0 control and space to be stripped per WHATWG spec.
# == "".join([chr(i) for i in range(0, 0x20 + 1)])
_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE = '\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\t\n\x0b\x0c\r\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f '

# Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec
_UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n']

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -456,6 +464,10 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""

url, scheme, _coerce_result = _coerce_args(url, scheme)
# Only lstrip url as some applications rely on preserving trailing space.
# (https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser would strip both)
url = url.lstrip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)
scheme = scheme.strip(_WHATWG_C0_CONTROL_OR_SPACE)

for b in _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE:
url = url.replace(b, "")
Expand Down
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
:func:`urllib.parse.urlsplit` now strips leading C0 control and space
characters following the specification for URLs defined by WHATWG in
response to CVE-2023-24329. Patch by Illia Volochii.

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