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MSC2444: peeking over federation via /peek #2444

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271 changes: 271 additions & 0 deletions proposals/2444-peeking-over-federation-peek-api.md
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# Proposal for implementing peeking over federation (peek API)

## Problem

Currently you can't peek over federation, as it was never designed or
implemented due to time constraints when peeking was originally added to Matrix
in 2016.

As well as stopping users from previewing rooms before joining, the fact that
servers can't participate in remote rooms without joining them first is
inconvenient in other ways:

* You can't use rooms as generic pubsub mechanisms for synchronising data like
profiles, groups, reputation lists, device-lists etc if you can't peek into
them remotely.
* Matrix-speaking search engines can't work if they can't peek remote rooms.
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This is also inconvenient for restricted spaces where the space just appears as an internal room ID before you try to join.


A related problem (not solved by this MSC) is that servers can't participate
in E2E encryption when peeking into a room, given the other users in the
room do not know to encrypt for the peeking device.

Another related problem (not solved by this MSC) is that invited users can't
reliably participate in E2E encryption before joining a room, given the invited
server doesn't currently have a way to know about new users/devices in the room
without peeking, and so doesn't tell them if the invited user's devices changes.
(https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/2713#issuecomment-691480736
outlines a fix to this, not covered by this MSC).

## Solution

We let servers participate in peekable rooms (i.e. those with `world_readable`
`m.room.history_visibility`) without having actually joined them.

Firstly, this means that a number of federation endpoints should be updated to
allow inspection of `world_readable` rooms. This includes:

* [`GET /_matrix/federation/v1/event_auth/{roomId}/{eventId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#get-matrix-federation-v1-event-auth-roomid-eventid)
* [`GET /_matrix/federation/v1/backfill/{roomId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#get-matrix-federation-v1-backfill-roomid)
* [`POST /_matrix/federation/v1/get_missing_events/{roomId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#post-matrix-federation-v1-get-missing-events-roomid)
* [`GET /_matrix/federation/v1/state/{roomId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#get-matrix-federation-v1-state-roomid)
* [`GET /_matrix/federation/v1/state_ids/{roomId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#get-matrix-federation-v1-state-ids-roomid)
* [`GET /_matrix/federation/v1/event/{eventId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#get-matrix-federation-v1-event-eventid)

(Of course, these apis should only allow access to `world_readable` parts of
the history.)

Secondly, we introduce a new API allowing servers to subscribe to new events.

### Initiating a peek
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Could we have some method of listing all current active peeks by a server? This may help reduce the amount of peeks open after a server crashes, and/or reuse old peeks, instead of initiating new ones. (e.g. if a server opens a 100 peeks to 100 profile rooms, and crashes, then blindly initiates 100 more peeks, it might be useful to see which of those 100 are still active, and "adopt" them)


To start peeking, firstly the peeking server must pick server(s) to peek
via. It can do this based on the `servers` parameter of the CS API `/peek`
command (from [MSC2753](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2753)),
or failing that the domain of the room alias being peeked.

The peeking server then makes a `/peek` request to the target server. An
example request and response might look like:

```
PUT /_matrix/federation/v1/peek/{roomId}/{peekId}?ver=5&ver=6 HTTP/1.1
{}

200 OK
{
"latest_event_state_ids": {
"$fwd_extremity_1": [
"$state_event_3",
"$state_event_4"
],
"$fwd_extremity_2": [
"$state_event_5",
"$state_event_6"
]
},
"common_state_ids": [
"$state_event_1",
"$state_event_2",
],
"events": [
{
"type": "m.room.member",
"room_id": "!somewhere:example.org",
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Wouldn't room_id be redundant here, considering we were querying the room id in the first place?

Also, see my note about the layout of events here (in another comment).

"content": { /* ... */ }
}
],
"renewal_interval": 3600000
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Suggested change
"renewal_interval": 3600000
"room_version": "6",
"renewal_interval": 3600000

}
```

The request takes an empty object as a body as a placeholder for future
extension.

The peeking server selects an ID for the peeking subscription for the purposes
of idempotency. The ID must be unique for a given `{ origin_server, room_id,
target_server }` tuple, and should be a string consisting of the characters
`[0-9a-zA-Z.=_-]`. Its length must not exceed 8 characters and it should not be
empty.
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Can we relax these requirements? Reasoning is that we often just want to use the room ID as the peek ID as in https://github.com/matrix-org/dendrite/pull/1391/files#r561821829

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why not use a fixed constant, given it is scoped to room id anyway?

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(I have a vague memory that I convinced myself that you needed to support more than one-peek-per-room and hence it was insufficient to use either a fixed constant or room id, but in any case I can't see the advantage of using room id rather than a fixed MY_PEEK)

Comment on lines +96 to +97
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8 chars is too few for large instances.

Suggested change
`[0-9a-zA-Z.=_-]`. Its length must not exceed 8 characters and it should not be
empty.
`[0-9a-zA-Z.=_-]`. It shall not be empty.


The request takes `?ver=` querystring parameters with the same behaviour as
`/make_join` to advertise the room versions the peeking server supports.

If the request is successful, the target server retuns a 200 response with the
following fields:
* `latest_event_state_ids`: a map whose keys are the IDs of the events forming
the target server's current forward extremities in the room. The values are
lists of the IDs of the events forming the room state after the event in
question, excluding any events in `common_state_ids`.

TBD: would the state *before* the extremity event be more useful?

* `common_state_ids`: A list of the IDs of any events which are common to the room
states after *all* of the forward extremities in the room.

* `events`: The bodies of any events whose IDs are:
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Arent these, in effect, only state events then? The language makes it ambiguous as to what events, exactly, would be included here.

Also, the language makes it uncertain as to what the exact body would look like of these events, should these be stripped down state events (like StrippedState as referenced under /sync)?

* listed in the keys of `latest_event_state_ids`, or:
* listed in the values of `latest_event_state_ids`, or:
* listed in the values of `common_state_ids`, or:
* listed in the `auth_events` field of any of the above events, or:
* listed in the `auth_events` of the `auth_events`, recursively.

* `renewal_interval`: a duration in milliseconds after which the target server
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Wouldn't seconds make more sense here? I don't think any value under a second is going to be reasonably useful.

will expire the peek. The peeking server must renew the peek before that
time to be sure of continuing to receive events.

If the room is not peekable, the target server should return a 403 error with
`M_FORBIDDEN`.
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Under which conditions? A room has to be globally readable? (for explicitness' sake)


If the room is not known to the target server, it should return a 404 error
with `M_NOT_FOUND`.
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Can't a server leak metadata about having joined a room by another server trying every known room ID on all servers it knows about? Shouldn't plausible deniability (always 404) be the default response here?


If the peek ID is not valid, the target server responds with 400 and `M_UNRECOGNIZED`.

If the room version of the room being peeked isn't supported by the peeking
server, the target server responds with 400 and `M_INCOMPATIBLE_ROOM_VERSION`.

If the target server doesn't wish to honour the peek request due to server load
or rate-limiting, it may respond with 429 and `M_LIMIT_EXCEEDED`, including a
`retry_after_ms` value indicating when the request could be retried.

The room states returned by `/peek` should be validated just as the one
returned by the `/send_join` API. If the peeking server finds the response
unacceptable, it should cancel the peek with a `DELETE` request (see below).

XXX: it might be better to split this into two operations: first fetch the
state data, then begin the peek operation by sending your idea of the forward
extremities, to bring you up to date with anything you missed. This would
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Shouldn't we "open" a peek first, and then fetch state via normal other APIs? (/state_ids comes to mind)

This'd reduce duplication on the API surface (and possibly in implementations)

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/state_ids could do more, and allow the server to be minimally impacted in such a "peek-unpeek-peek" event (as described below), by only resolving the missing state events, and backfilling the remaining events.

reduce the chance of having to immediately cancel a peek, and would be more
efficient in the case of rapid `peek-unpeek-peek` switches.
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I'm leaving this open for now, pending work on an implementation, which I hope will provide guidance.


While a peek subscription is active, the target server must relay any events
received in that room over the [`PUT
/_matrix/federation/v1/send/{txnId}`](https://matrix.org/docs/spec/server_server/r0.1.4#put-matrix-federation-v1-send-txnid)
API.

### Renewing a peek

The target server will eventually expire a peek if it is not renewed. The
peeking server can renew a peek by calling `POST
/_matrix/federation/v1/peek/{roomId}/{peekId}/renew`:

```
POST /_matrix/federation/v1/peek/{roomId}/{peekId}/renew HTTP/1.1
{}

200 OK
{
"renewal_interval": 3600000
}
```

The target server simply returns the new `renewal_interval`.

If the peek ID is not known for the `{ origin_server, room_id, target_server }`
tuple, the target server returns a 404 error with `M_NOT_FOUND`.

### Deleting a peek

The peeking server may terminate a peek by calling `DELETE
/_matrix/federation/v1/peek/{roomId}/{peekId}`:

```
DELETE /_matrix/federation/v1/peek/{roomId}/{peekId} HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 0

200 OK
{}
```
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The request has no body <sup id="a1">[1](#f1)</sup>. On success, the target
server returns a 200 with an empty json object.
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Should a transaction with expired_peeks be sent after this to initiate the "flush" of the peek expiry?


If the peek ID is not known for the `{ origin_server, room_id, target_server }`
tuple, the target server returns a 404 error with `M_NOT_FOUND`.

### Expiring a peek

The target server should expire any peek which is not renewed before the
`renewal_interval` elapses.

XXX how to tell the peeking server?

### Joining a room

When the user joins the peeked room, the peeking server should just emit the
right membership event rather than calling `/make_join` or `/send_join`, to
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❤️

avoid the unnecessary burden of a full room join, given the server is already
participating in the room. It should also send a `DELETE` request to cancel
any active peeks.

### Encrypted rooms

It is considered a feature that you cannot peek into encrypted rooms, given
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What I'm reading here is;

If a room has m.room.encrypted state set, it cannot be peeked.

Is this correct? If so, please make this explicit in the wording.

the act of peeking would leak the identity of the peeker to the joined users
in the room (as they'd need to encrypt for the peeker). This also feels
acceptable given there is little point in encrypting something intended to be
world-readable.

## Alternatives

* simply use `room_id` for idempotency rather than requiring a separate
`peek_id`. One reason not to do this is to allow a future extension where
there are multiple subscriptions active, each filtering out different event
types. In the meantime, implementers can use a hard-coded constant.

## Security considerations

The peeked server becomes a centralisation point which could conspire against
the peeking server to withhold events. This is not that dissimilar to trying
to join a room via a malicious server, however, and can be mitigated somewhat
if the peeking server tries to query missing events from other servers.
The peeking server could also peek to multiple servers for resilience against
this sort of attack.

The peeked server will be able to track the metadata surrounding which servers
are peeking into which of its rooms, and when. This could be particularly
sensitive for single-person servers peeking at profile rooms.

## Design considerations

This doesn't solve the problem that rooms wink out of existence when all
participants leave (https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/534),
unlike other approaches to peeking (e.g. MSC1777)

Do we allow filtering the peek? (e.g. if you only care about particular
events, or particular servers - e.g. if load-balancing peeking via multiple
servers). Similarly, is it concerning that this significantly overlaps with
the /sync CS API?
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How do we handle backpressure or rate limiting on the event stream (if at
all?)
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(I think this is missing an XXX:)

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Also, re: the comment; I think currently it should be handled like normal federation mechanics, where delays in /send requests already sorta back-pressure other servers sending federation events. This does it on a server-to-server basis, not a room basis, but discussing solutions to that is out of scope for this MSC.


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## Dependencies
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(Shouldn't this be "dependants"? :P)


This unblocks MSC1769 (profiles as rooms) and MSC1772 (groups as rooms)
and is required for MSC2753 (peeking via /sync) to be of any use.

## History

This would close https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/913

An earlier rejected solution is MSC1777, which proposed joining a pseudouser
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(`@:server`) to a room in order to peek into it. However, being forced to write
to a room DAG (by joining such a user) in order to perform a read-only operation
(peeking) was deemed inefficient and rejected.


## Footnotes

<a id="f1"/>[1]: per
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-12.html#name-delete:
"A client SHOULD NOT generate a body in a DELETE request." [↩](#a1)