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Trullala #1
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ghost
assigned dscho
Apr 13, 2012
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dscho
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entry_count is used in update_one() for two purposes: 1. to skip through the number of processed entries in in-memory index 2. to record the number of entries this cache-tree covers on disk Unfortunately when CE_REMOVE is present these numbers are not the same because CE_REMOVE entries are automatically removed before writing to disk but entry_count is not adjusted and still counts CE_REMOVE entries. Separate the two use cases into two different variables. #1 is taken care by the new field count in struct cache_tree_sub and entry_count is prepared for #2. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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The DWIM mode of checkout allows you to run "git checkout foo" when there is no existing local ref or path called "foo", and there is exactly _one_ remote with a remote-tracking branch called "foo". Git will automatically create a new local branch called "foo" using the remote-tracking "foo" as its starting point and configured upstream. For example, consider the following unconventional (but perfectly valid) remote setup: [remote "origin"] fetch = refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/* [remote "frotz"] fetch = refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/frotz/nitfol/* Case 1: Assume both "origin" and "frotz" have remote-tracking branches called "foo", at "refs/remotes/origin/foo" and "refs/remotes/frotz/nitfol/foo" respectively. In this case "git checkout foo" should fail, because there is more than one remote with a "foo" branch. Case 2: Assume only "frotz" have a remote-tracking branch called "foo". In this case "git checkout foo" should succeed, and create a local branch "foo" from "refs/remotes/frotz/nitfol/foo", using remote branch "foo" from "frotz" as its upstream. The current code hardcodes the assumption that all remote-tracking branches must match the "refs/remotes/$remote/*" pattern (which is true for remotes with "conventional" refspecs, but not true for the "frotz" remote above). When running "git checkout foo", the current code looks for exactly one ref matching "refs/remotes/*/foo", hence in the above example, it fails to find "refs/remotes/frotz/nitfol/foo", which causes it to fail both case #1 and #2. The better way to handle the above example is to actually study the fetch refspecs to deduce the candidate remote-tracking branches for "foo"; i.e. assume "foo" is a remote branch being fetched, and then map "refs/heads/foo" through the refspecs in order to get the corresponding remote-tracking branches "refs/remotes/origin/foo" and "refs/remotes/frotz/nitfol/foo". Finally we check which of these happens to exist in the local repo, and if there is exactly one, we have an unambiguous match for "git checkout foo", and may proceed. This fixes most of the failing tests introduced in the previous patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Herland <johan@herland.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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We have two ways of dealing with empty pathspec: 1. limit it to current prefix 2. match the entire working directory Some commands go with #1, some #2. get_pathspec() and parse_pathspec() only support #1. Make parse_pathspec() reject empty pathspec by default. #1 and #2 can be specified via new flags. This makes it more expressive about default behavior at command level. Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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Aug 6, 2014
In 41c21f2 (branch.c: Validate tracking branches with refspecs instead of refs/remotes/*), we changed the rules for what is considered a valid tracking branch (a.k.a. upstream branch). We now use the configured remotes and their refspecs to determine whether a proposed tracking branch is in fact within the domain of a remote, and we then use that information to deduce the upstream configuration (branch.<name>.remote and branch.<name>.merge). However, with that change, we also check that - in addition to a matching refspec - the result of mapping the tracking branch through that refspec (i.e. the corresponding ref name in the remote repo) happens to start with "refs/heads/". In other words, we require that a tracking branch refers to a _branch_ in the remote repo. Now, consider that you are e.g. setting up an automated building/testing infrastructure for a group of similar "source" repositories. The build/test infrastructure consists of a central scheduler, and a number of build/test "slave" machines that perform the actual build/test work. The scheduler monitors the group of similar repos for changes (e.g. with a periodic "git fetch"), and triggers builds/tests to be run on one or more slaves. Graphically the changes flow between the repos like this: Source #1 -------v ----> Slave #1 / Source #2 -----> Scheduler -----> Slave #2 \ Source #3 -------^ ----> Slave #3 ... ... The scheduler maintains a single Git repo with each of the source repos set up as distinct remotes. The slaves also need access to all the changes from all of the source repos, so they pull from the scheduler repo, but using the following custom refspec: remote.origin.fetch = "+refs/remotes/*:refs/remotes/*" This makes all of the scheduler's remote-tracking branches automatically available as identical remote-tracking branches in each of the slaves. Now, consider what happens if a slave tries to create a local branch with one of the remote-tracking branches as upstream: git branch local_branch --track refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch Git now looks at the configured remotes (in this case there is only "origin", pointing to the scheduler's repo) and sees refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch matching origin's refspec. Mapping through that refspec we find that the corresponding remote ref name is "refs/remotes/source-1/some_branch". However, since this remote ref name does not start with "refs/heads/", we discard it as a suitable upstream, and the whole command fails. This patch adds a testcase demonstrating this failure by creating two source repos ("a" and "b") that are forwarded through a scheduler ("c") to a slave repo ("d"), that then tries create a local branch with an upstream. See the next patch in this series for the exciting conclusion to this story... Reported-by: Per Cederqvist <cederp@opera.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Herland <johan@herland.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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Sep 10, 2014
The main loop in strbuf_utf8_replace() could summed up as: while ('src' is still valid) { 1) advance 'src' to copy ANSI escape sequences 2) advance 'src' to copy/replace visible characters } The problem is after #1, 'src' may have reached the end of the string (so 'src' points to NUL) and #2 will continue to copy that NUL as if it's a normal character. Because the output is stored in a strbuf, this NUL accounted in the 'len' field as well. Check after #1 and break the loop if necessary. The test does not look obvious, but the combination of %>>() should make a call trace like this show_log() pretty_print_commit() format_commit_message() strbuf_expand() format_commit_item() format_and_pad_commit() strbuf_utf8_replace() where %C(auto)%d would insert a color reset escape sequence in the end of the string given to strbuf_utf8_replace() and show_log() uses fwrite() to send everything to stdout (including the incorrect NUL inserted by strbuf_utf8_replace) Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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Jan 18, 2015
Don't chop test_expect_success line into pieces and concatenate with '\'. That's so 2005. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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Jan 18, 2015
dscho
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dscho
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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The collect_parents() function now is responsible for 1. parsing the commits given on the command line into a list of commits to be merged; 2. filtering these parents into independent ones; and 3. optionally calling fmt_merge_msg() via prepare_merge_message() to prepare an auto-generated merge log message, using fake contents that FETCH_HEAD would have had if these commits were fetched from the current repository with "git pull . $args..." Make "git merge FETCH_HEAD" to be the same as the traditional git merge "$(git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD)" $commits invocation of the command in "git pull", where $commits are the ones that appear in FETCH_HEAD that are not marked as not-for-merge, by making it do a bit more, specifically: - noticing "FETCH_HEAD" is the only "commit" on the command line and picking the commits that are not marked as not-for-merge as the list of commits to be merged (substitute for step #1 above); - letting the resulting list fed to step #2 above; - doing the step #3 above, using the contents of the FETCH_HEAD instead of fake contents crafted from the list of commits parsed in the step #1 above. Note that this changes the semantics. "git merge FETCH_HEAD" has always behaved as if the first commit in the FETCH_HEAD file were directly specified on the command line, creating a two-way merge whose auto-generated merge log said "merge commit xyz". With this change, if the previous fetch was to grab multiple branches (e.g. "git fetch $there topic-a topic-b"), the new world order is to create an octopus, behaving as if "git pull $there topic-a topic-b" were run. This is a deliberate change to make that happen, and can be seen in the changes to t3033 tests. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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Jan 23, 2023
When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
dscho
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With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Includes these pull requests: #1 #6 #10 #11 msysgit#157 msysgit#212 msysgit#260 msysgit#270 Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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When "read_strategy_opts()" is called we may have populated the "opts->strategy" before, so we'll need to free() it to avoid leaking memory. We populate it before because we cal get_replay_opts() from within "rebase.c" with an already populated "opts", which we then copy. Then if we're doing a "rebase -i" the sequencer API itself will promptly clobber our alloc'd version of it with its own. If this code is changed to do, instead of the added free() here a: if (opts->strategy) opts->strategy = xstrdup("another leak"); We get a couple of stacktraces from -fsanitize=leak showing how we ended up clobbering the already allocated value, i.e.: Direct leak of 6 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x66bcb8 in read_strategy_opts sequencer.c:2902 #4 0x66bf7b in read_populate_opts sequencer.c:2969 #5 0x6723f9 in sequencer_continue sequencer.c:5063 #6 0x4a4f74 in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:348 #7 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #8 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #9 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #15 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #16 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2e8cd45545 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:75 #1 0x7f2e8cb0fcaa in __GI___strdup string/strdup.c:42 #2 0x6c4778 in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #3 0x4a3c31 in xstrdup_or_null git-compat-util.h:1169 #4 0x4a447a in get_replay_opts builtin/rebase.c:163 #5 0x4a4f5b in run_sequencer_rebase builtin/rebase.c:346 #6 0x4a64c8 in run_specific_rebase builtin/rebase.c:753 #7 0x4a9b8b in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1824 #8 0x407a32 in run_builtin git.c:466 #9 0x407e0a in handle_builtin git.c:721 #10 0x40803d in run_argv git.c:788 #11 0x40850f in cmd_main git.c:923 #12 0x4eee79 in main common-main.c:57 #13 0x7f2e8ca9f209 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #14 0x7f2e8ca9f2bb in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:389 #15 0x405fd0 in _start (git+0x405fd0) This can be seen in e.g. the 4th test of "t3404-rebase-interactive.sh". In the larger picture the ownership of the "struct replay_opts" is quite a mess, e.g. in this case rebase.c's static "get_replay_opts()" function partially creates it, but nothing in rebase.c will free() it. The structure is "mostly owned" by the sequencer API, but it also expects to get these partially populated versions of it. It would be better to have rebase keep track of what it allocated, and free() that, and to pass that as a "const" to the sequencer API, which would copy what it needs to its own version, and to free() that. But doing so is a much larger change, and however messy the ownership boundary is here is consistent with what we're doing already, so let's just free() this to fix the leak. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
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When rebasing a regular merge between two parent commits, we have that problem that we have to perform *two* 3-way merges, because we want to merge in the changes (like amendments, merge conflict resolutions, etc) from the original merge commit, too. When the first of these 3-way merges already had conflicts, then we run the chance of ending up with nested conflicts in the second 3-way merge. So let's see in that case whether we gain something by merging the original merge commit with the other parent first, and if that resulted in a clean merge, proceed to merge the first parent (in this case, we cannot end up with nested merge conflicts). This simplifies the realistic example of a nested merge conflict to a non-nested merge conflict. Before: int hi(void) { printf("Hello, world!\n"); } <<<<<<< intermediate merge <<<<<<<< HEAD /* main event loop */ void event_loop(void) { /* TODO: place holder for now */ ======== ======= } >>>>>>> <HASH>... merge head #1 /* caller */ void caller(void) { hi(); >>>>>>>> <HASH>... original merge } With this patch, this becomes much simpler: int hi(void) { printf("Hello, world!\n"); } /* main event loop */ void event_loop(void) { /* TODO: place holder for now */ } <<<<<<<< HEAD ======== /* caller */ void caller(void) { hi(); } >>>>>>>> <HASH>... intermediate merge Note: this needs to be refactored and stuff and things. It may even be necessary to dive deeper into the code and implement a "W merge" that avoids the problem where (one part of) one file would benefit from merging the second parent before the first, while another (part of the same) file would benefit from the reverse order. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Includes these pull requests: #1 #6 #10 #11 msysgit#157 msysgit#212 msysgit#260 msysgit#270 Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Acked-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When "update-index --unresolve $path" cannot find the resolve-undo record for the path the user requested to unresolve, it stuffs the blobs from HEAD and MERGE_HEAD to stage #2 and stage #3 as a fallback. For this reason, the operation does not even start unless both "HEAD" and "MERGE_HEAD" exist. This is suboptimal in a few ways: * It does not recreate stage #1. Even though it is a correct design decision not to do so (because it is impossible to recreate in general cases, without knowing how we got there, including what merge strategy was used), it is much less useful not to have that information in the index. * It limits the "unresolve" operation only during a conflicted "git merge" and nothing else. Other operations like "rebase", "cherry-pick", and "switch -m" may result in conflicts, and the user may want to unresolve the conflict that they incorrectly resolved in order to redo the resolution, but the fallback would not kick in. * Most importantly, the entire "unresolve" operation is disabled after a conflicted merge is committed and MERGE_HEAD is removed, even though the index has perfectly usable resolve-undo records. By lazily reading the HEAD and MERGE_HEAD only when we need to go to the fallback codepath, we will allow cases where resolve-undo records are available (which is 100% of the time, unless the user is reading from an index file created by Git more than 10 years ago) to proceed even after a conflicted merge was committed, during other mergy operations that do not use MERGE_HEAD, or after the result of such mergy operations has been committed. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Jan 24, 2024
It is tempting to think of "files and directories" of the current directory as valid inputs to the add and set subcommands of git sparse-checkout. However, in non-cone mode, they often aren't and using them as potential completions leads to *many* forms of confusion: Issue #1. It provides the *wrong* files and directories. For git sparse-checkout add we always want to add files and directories not currently in our sparse checkout, which means we want file and directories not currently present in the current working tree. Providing the files and directories currently present is thus always wrong. For git sparse-checkout set we have a similar problem except in the subset of cases where we are trying to narrow our checkout to a strict subset of what we already have. That is not a very common scenario, especially since it often does not even happen to be true for the first use of the command; for years we required users to create a sparse-checkout via git sparse-checkout init git sparse-checkout set <args...> (or use a clone option that did the init step for you at clone time). The init command creates a minimal sparse-checkout with just the top-level directory present, meaning the set command has to be used to expand the checkout. Thus, only in a special and perhaps unusual cases would any of the suggestions from normal file and directory completion be appropriate. Issue #2: Suggesting patterns that lead to warnings is unfriendly. If the user specifies any regular file and omits the leading '/', then the sparse-checkout command will warn the user that their command is problematic and suggest they use a leading slash instead. Issue #3: Completion gets confused by leading '/', and provides wrong paths. Users often want to anchor their patterns to the toplevel of the repository, especially when listing individual files. There are a number of reasons for this, but notably even sparse-checkout encourages them to do so (as noted above). However, if users do so (via adding a leading '/' to their pattern), then bash completion will interpret the leading slash not as a request for a path at the toplevel of the repository, but as a request for a path at the root of the filesytem. That means at best that completion cannot help with such paths, and if it does find any completions, they are almost guaranteed to be wrong. Issue #4: Suggesting invalid patterns from subdirectories is unfriendly. There is no per-directory equivalent to .gitignore with sparse-checkouts. There is only a single worktree-global $GIT_DIR/info/sparse-checkout file. As such, paths to files must be specified relative to the toplevel of a repository. Providing suggestions of paths that are relative to the current working directory, as bash completion defaults to, is wrong when the current working directory is not the worktree toplevel directory. Issue #5: Paths with special characters will be interpreted incorrectly The entries in the sparse-checkout file are patterns, not paths. While most paths also qualify as patterns (though even in such cases it would be better for users to not use them directly but prefix them with a leading '/'), there are a variety of special characters that would need special escaping beyond the normal shell escaping: '*', '?', '\', '[', ']', and any leading '#' or '!'. If completion suggests any such paths, users will likely expect them to be treated as an exact path rather than as a pattern that might match some number of files other than 1. However, despite the first four issues, we can note that _if_ users are using tab completion, then they are probably trying to specify a path in the index. As such, we transform their argument into a top-level-rooted pattern that matches such a file. For example, if they type: git sparse-checkout add Make<TAB> we could "complete" to git sparse-checkout add /Makefile or, if they ran from the Documentation/technical/ subdirectory: git sparse-checkout add m<TAB> we could "complete" it to: git sparse-checkout add /Documentation/technical/multi-pack-index.txt Note in both cases I use "complete" in quotes, because we actually add characters both before and after the argument in question, so we are kind of abusing "bash completions" to be "bash completions AND beginnings". The fifth issue is a bit stickier, especially when you consider that we not only need to deal with escaping issues because of special meanings of patterns in sparse-checkout & gitignore files, but also that we need to consider escaping issues due to ls-files needing to sometimes quote or escape characters, and because the shell needs to escape some characters. The multiple interacting forms of escaping could get ugly; this patch makes no attempt to do so and simply documents that we decided to not deal with those corner cases for now but at least get the common cases right. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Recent versions of the gcc and clang Address Sanitizer produce test failures related to regexec(). This triggers with gcc-10 and clang-8 (but not gcc-9 nor clang-7). Running: make CC=gcc-10 SANITIZE=address test results in failures in t4018, t3206, and t4062. The cause seems to be that when built with ASan, we use a different version of regexec() than normal. And this version doesn't understand the REG_STARTEND flag. Here's my evidence supporting that. The failure in t4062 is an ASan warning: expecting success of 4062.2 '-G matches': git diff --name-only -G "^(0{64}){64}$" HEAD^ >out && test 4096-zeroes.txt = "$(cat out)" ================================================================= ==672994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fa76f672000 at pc 0x7fa7726f75b6 bp 0x7ffe41bdda70 sp 0x7ffe41bdd220 READ of size 4097 at 0x7fa76f672000 thread T0 #0 0x7fa7726f75b5 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.6+0x4f5b5) #1 0x562ae0c9c40e in regexec_buf /home/peff/compile/git/git-compat-util.h:1117 #2 0x562ae0c9c40e in diff_grep /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:52 #3 0x562ae0c9cc28 in pickaxe_match /home/peff/compile/git/diffcore-pickaxe.c:166 [...] In this case we're looking in a buffer which was mmap'd via reuse_worktree_file(), and whose size is 4096 bytes. But libasan's regex tries to look at byte 4097 anyway! If we tweak Git like this: diff --git a/diff.c b/diff.c index 8e2914c031..cfae60c120 100644 --- a/diff.c +++ b/diff.c @@ -3880,7 +3880,7 @@ static int reuse_worktree_file(struct index_state *istate, */ if (ce_uptodate(ce) || (!lstat(name, &st) && !ie_match_stat(istate, ce, &st, 0))) - return 1; + return 0; return 0; } to use a regular buffer (with a trailing NUL) instead of an mmap, then the complaint goes away. The other failures are actually diff output with an incorrect funcname header. If I instrument xdiff to show the funcname matching like so: diff --git a/xdiff-interface.c b/xdiff-interface.c index 8509f9ea22..f6c3dc1986 100644 --- a/xdiff-interface.c +++ b/xdiff-interface.c @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct ff_regs { struct ff_reg { regex_t re; int negate; + char *printable; } *array; }; @@ -218,7 +219,12 @@ static long ff_regexp(const char *line, long len, for (i = 0; i < regs->nr; i++) { struct ff_reg *reg = regs->array + i; - if (!regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0)) { + int ret = regexec_buf(®->re, line, len, 2, pmatch, 0); + warning("regexec %s:\n regex: %s\n buf: %.*s", + ret == 0 ? "matched" : "did not match", + reg->printable, + (int)len, line); + if (!ret) { if (reg->negate) return -1; break; @@ -264,6 +270,7 @@ void xdiff_set_find_func(xdemitconf_t *xecfg, const char *value, int cflags) expression = value; if (regcomp(®->re, expression, cflags)) die("Invalid regexp to look for hunk header: %s", expression); + reg->printable = xstrdup(expression); free(buffer); value = ep + 1; } then when compiling with ASan and gcc-10, running the diff from t4018.66 produces this: $ git diff -U1 cpp-skip-access-specifiers warning: regexec did not match: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: private: diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ private: void DoSomething(); int ChangeMe; }; void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; That first regex should match (and is negated, so it should be telling us _not_ to match "private:"). But it wouldn't if regexec() is looking at the whole buffer, and not just the length-limited line we've fed to regexec_buf(). So this is consistent again with REG_STARTEND being ignored. The correct output (compiling without ASan, or gcc-9 with Asan) looks like this: warning: regexec matched: regex: ^[ ]*[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z_0-9]*:[[:space:]]*($|/[/*]) buf: private: [...more lines that we end up not using...] warning: regexec matched: regex: ^((::[[:space:]]*)?[A-Za-z_].*)$ buf: class RIGHT : public Baseclass diff --git a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers index 4d4a9db..ebd6f42 100644 --- a/cpp-skip-access-specifiers +++ b/cpp-skip-access-specifiers @@ -6,3 +6,3 @@ class RIGHT : public Baseclass void DoSomething(); - int ChangeMe; + int IWasChanged; }; So it really does seem like libasan's regex engine is ignoring REG_STARTEND. We should be able to work around it by compiling with NO_REGEX, which would use our local regexec(). But to make matters even more interesting, this isn't enough by itself. Because ASan has support from the compiler, it doesn't seem to intercept our call to regexec() at the dynamic library level. It actually recognizes when we are compiling a call to regexec() and replaces it with ASan-specific code at that point. And unlike most of our other compat code, where we might have git_mmap() or similar, the actual symbol name in the compiled compat/regex code is regexec(). So just compiling with NO_REGEX isn't enough; we still end up in libasan! We can work around that by having the preprocessor replace regexec with git_regexec (both in the callers and in the actual implementation), and we truly end up with a call to our custom regex code, even when compiling with ASan. That's probably a good thing to do anyway, as it means anybody looking at the symbols later (e.g., in a debugger) would have a better indication of which function is which. So we'll do the same for the other common regex functions (even though just regexec() is enough to fix this ASan problem). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When reusing objects from a pack, we keep track of a set of one or more `reused_chunk`s, corresponding to sections of one or more object(s) from a source pack that we are reusing. Each chunk contains two pieces of information: - the offset of the first object in the source pack (relative to the beginning of the source pack) - the difference between that offset, and the corresponding offset in the pack we're generating The purpose of keeping track of these is so that we can patch an OFS_DELTAs that cross over a section of the reuse pack that we didn't take. For instance, consider a hypothetical pack as shown below: (chunk #2) __________... / / +--------+---------+-------------------+---------+ ... | <base> | <other> | (unused) | <delta> | ... +--------+---------+-------------------+---------+ \ / \______________/ (chunk #1) Suppose that we are sending objects "base", "other", and "delta", and that the "delta" object is stored as an OFS_DELTA, and that its base is "base". If we don't send any objects in the "(unused)" range, we can't copy the delta'd object directly, since its delta offset includes a range of the pack that we didn't copy, so we have to account for that difference when patching and reassembling the delta. In order to compute this value correctly, we need to know not only where we are in the packfile we're assembling (with `hashfile_total(f)`) but also the position of the first byte of the packfile that we are currently reusing. Currently, this works just fine, since when reusing only a single pack those two values are always identical (because verbatim reuse is the first thing pack-objects does when enabled after writing the pack header). But when reusing multiple packs which have one or more gaps, we'll need to account for these two values diverging. Together, these two allow us to compute the reused chunk's offset difference relative to the start of the reused pack, as desired. Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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The t5309 script triggers a racy false positive with SANITIZE=leak on a multi-core system. Running with "--stress --run=6" usually fails within 10 seconds or so for me, complaining with something like: + git index-pack --fix-thin --stdin fatal: REF_DELTA at offset 46 already resolved (duplicate base 01d7713666f4de822776c7622c10f1b07de280dc?) ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted What happens is this: 0. We construct a bogus pack with a duplicate object in it and trigger index-pack. 1. We spawn a bunch of worker threads to resolve deltas (on my system it is 16 threads). 2. One of the threads sees the duplicate object and bails by calling exit(), taking down all of the threads. This is expected and is the point of the test. 3. At the time exit() is called, we may still be spawning threads from the main process via pthread_create(). LSan hooks thread creation to update its book-keeping; it has to know where each thread's stack is (so it can find entry points for reachable memory). So it calls pthread_getattr_np() to get information about the new thread. That may allocate memory that must be freed with a matching call to pthread_attr_destroy(). Probably LSan does that immediately, but if you're unlucky enough, the exit() will happen while it's between those two calls, and the allocated pthread_attr_t appears as a leak. This isn't a real leak. It's not even in our code, but rather in the LSan instrumentation code. So we could just ignore it. But the false positive can cause people to waste time tracking it down. It's possibly something that LSan could protect against (e.g., cover the getattr/destroy pair with a mutex, and then in the final post-exit() check for leaks try to take the same mutex). But I don't know enough about LSan to say if that's a reasonable approach or not (or if my analysis is even completely correct). In the meantime, it's pretty easy to avoid the race by making creation of the worker threads "atomic". That is, we'll spawn all of them before letting any of them start to work. That's easy to do because we already have a work_lock() mutex for handing out that work. If the main process takes it, then all of the threads will immediately block until we've finished spawning and released it. This shouldn't make any practical difference for non-LSan runs. The thread spawning is quick, and could happen before any worker thread gets scheduled anyway. Probably other spots that use threads are subject to the same issues. But since we have to manually insert locking (and since this really is kind of a hack), let's not bother with them unless somebody experiences a similar racy false-positive in practice. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Includes these pull requests: #1 #6 #10 #11 msysgit#157 msysgit#212 msysgit#260 msysgit#270 Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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Includes these pull requests: #1 #6 #10 #11 msysgit#157 msysgit#212 msysgit#260 msysgit#270 Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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Commit d6a8c58 (midx-write.c: support reading an existing MIDX with `packs_to_include`, 2024-05-29) changed the MIDX generation machinery to support reading from an existing MIDX when writing a new one. Unfortunately, the rest of the MIDX generation machinery is not prepared to deal with such a change. For instance, the function responsible for adding to the object ID fanout table from a MIDX source (midx_fanout_add_midx_fanout()) will gladly add objects from an existing MIDX for some fanout level regardless of whether or not those objects came from packs that are to be included in the subsequent MIDX write. This results in broken pseudo-pack object order (leading to incorrect object traversal results) and segmentation faults, like so (generated by running the added test prior to the changes in midx-write.c): #0 0x000055ee31393f47 in midx_pack_order (ctx=0x7ffdde205c70) at midx-write.c:590 #1 0x000055ee31395a69 in write_midx_internal (object_dir=0x55ee32570440 ".git/objects", packs_to_include=0x7ffdde205e20, packs_to_drop=0x0, preferred_pack_name=0x0, refs_snapshot=0x0, flags=15) at midx-write.c:1171 #2 0x000055ee31395f38 in write_midx_file_only (object_dir=0x55ee32570440 ".git/objects", packs_to_include=0x7ffdde205e20, preferred_pack_name=0x0, refs_snapshot=0x0, flags=15) at midx-write.c:1274 [...] In stack frame #0, the code on midx-write.c:590 is using the new pack ID corresponding to some object which was added from the existing MIDX. Importantly, the pack from which that object was selected in the existing MIDX does not appear in the new MIDX as it was excluded via `--stdin-packs`. In this instance, the pack in question had pack ID "1" in the existing MIDX, but since it was excluded from the new MIDX, we never filled in that entry in the pack_perm table, resulting in: (gdb) p *ctx->pack_perm@2 $1 = {0, 1515870810} Which is what causes the segfault above when we try and read: struct pack_info *pack = &ctx->info[ctx->pack_perm[i]]; if (pack->bitmap_pos == BITMAP_POS_UNKNOWN) pack->bitmap_pos = 0; Fundamentally, we should be able to read information from an existing MIDX when generating a new one. But in practice the midx-write.c code assumes that we won't run into issues like the above with incongruent pack IDs, and often makes those assumptions in extremely subtle and fragile ways. Instead, let's avoid reading from an existing MIDX altogether, and stick with the pre-d6a8c58675 implementation. Harden against any regressions in this area by adding a test which demonstrates these issues. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When performing multi-pack reuse, reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() is responsible for generating an array of bitmapped_pack structs from which to perform reuse. In the multi-pack case, we loop over the MIDXs packs and copy the result of calling `nth_bitmapped_pack()` to construct the list of reusable paths. But we may also want to do pack-reuse over a single pack, either because we only had one pack to perform reuse over (in the case of single-pack bitmaps), or because we explicitly asked to do single pack reuse even with a MIDX[^1]. When this is the case, the array we generate of reusable packs contains only a single element, which is either (a) the pack attached to the single-pack bitmap, or (b) the MIDX's preferred pack. In 795006f (pack-bitmap: gracefully handle missing BTMP chunks, 2024-04-15), we refactored the reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() function and stopped assigning the pack_int_id field when reusing only the MIDX's preferred pack. This results in an uninitialized read down in try_partial_reuse() like so: ==7474==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55c5cd191dde in try_partial_reuse pack-bitmap.c:1887:8 #1 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap_1 pack-bitmap.c:2001:8 #2 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:2105:3 #3 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list_from_bitmap builtin/pack-objects.c:4043:3 #4 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list builtin/pack-objects.c:4156:27 #5 0x55c5cce0bd0e in cmd_pack_objects builtin/pack-objects.c:4596:3 #6 0x55c5ccc8fac8 in run_builtin git.c:474:11 which happens when try_partial_reuse() tries to call midx_pair_to_pack_pos() when it tries to reject cross-pack deltas. Avoid the uninitialized read by ensuring that the pack_int_id field is set in the single-pack reuse case by setting it to either the MIDX preferred pack's pack_int_id, or '-1', in the case of single-pack bitmaps. In the latter case, we never read the pack_int_id field, so the choice of '-1' is intentional as a "garbage in, garbage out" measure. Guard against further regressions in this area by adding a test which ensures that we do not throw out deltas from the preferred pack as "cross-pack" due to an uninitialized pack_int_id. [^1]: This can happen for a couple of reasons, either because the repository is configured with 'pack.allowPackReuse=(true|single)', or because the MIDX was generated prior to the introduction of the BTMP chunk, which contains information necessary to perform multi-pack reuse. Reported-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable (`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`: ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11 #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6 #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2 #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2 #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2 #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2 #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2 #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34 #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7 #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7 #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9 #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7 #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18 #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11 #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3 #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4 #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19 #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11 The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from `read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if `read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks `size` before checking `!buf`. Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set. Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When using `--fixed-value` with a key whose value is left empty (implied as being "true"), 'git config' may crash when invoked like either of: $ git config set --file=config --value=value --fixed-value \ section.key pattern $ git config --file=config --fixed-value section.key value pattern The original bugreport[1] bisects to 00bbdde (builtin/config: introduce "set" subcommand, 2024-05-06), which is a red-herring, since the original bugreport uses the new 'git config set' invocation. The behavior likely bisects back to c90702a (config: plumb --fixed-value into config API, 2020-11-25), which introduces the new --fixed-value option in the first place. Looking at the relevant frame from a failed process's coredump, the crash appears in config.c::matches() like so: (gdb) up #1 0x000055b3e8b06022 in matches (key=0x55b3ea894360 "section.key", value=0x0, store=0x7ffe99076eb0) at config.c:2884 2884 return !strcmp(store->fixed_value, value); where we are trying to compare the `--fixed-value` argument to `value`, which is NULL. Avoid attempting to match `--fixed-value` for configuration keys with no explicit value. A future patch could consider the empty value to mean "true", "yes", "on", etc. when invoked with `--type=bool`, but let's punt on that for now in the name of avoiding the segfault. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/CANrWfmTek1xErBLrnoyhHN+gWU+rw14y6SQ+abZyzGoaBjmiKA@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Han Jiang <jhcarl0814@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Sep 13, 2024
It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads. Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator. The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory, which of course segfaults. One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack traces like the following one: + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0) ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29 #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170 #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194 #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398 #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240 #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355 #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339 #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69 #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123 #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172 #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175 #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464 #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13 #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452 #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623 #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659 #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133 #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432 #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484 #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741 #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805 #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000 #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64 #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27) While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't. The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore. Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted. Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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