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Post-Compromise - Microsoft Cloud

CISA and others have discussed this APTs attention to Microsoft Cloud observed from public and private sector victims. The nature of this type of threat is less frequently addressed in advisories; when compared to the attention given to internal network security. Here we will discuss some information and guidance primarily from Microsoft and CISA.

Detection Methods

Microsoft's cloud environments have built in detections for unusual activity. Additionally, many collect telemetry from Microsoft Graph or Audit APIs and ingest into a SIEM. Both of these can be reviewed for signs of abnormal activity.

Monitor for App Registration and Service Principals
The adversary has been observed targeting Azure AD as a component of its lateral movement. As mentioned in readme, this is done with compromised administrative accounts or by forging SAML tokens with compromised signing tokens.[2][6]

SAML

  • No associated account with token
  • Impossible tokens: default is 1-hour token ttl; long lived tokens could indicate malicious activity.
  • Tokens should be issues before use. An identical timestamp for both creation and use should not occur.

If you brought Azure AD data into a SIEM you can look for the following:
note: these queries will be in SPL; however, the same events can be searched for with other query languages in other products

Added Service Principal
sourcetype="azure:aad:audit" activityDisplayName="Add service principal credentials"

Permission or Role Assignment
sourcetype="azure:aad:audit" activityDisplayName="Add app role assignment to service principal" OR activityDisplayName="Add delegated permission grant" OR activityDisplayName="Add application"

Multi Tenant Apps
sourcetype="azure:aad:audit" activityDisplayName="Update application" operationType=Update result=success targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName=AvailableToOtherTenants

CrowdStrikes Reporting Tool for Azure

CRT is a free community tool that will help organizations quickly and easily review excessive permissions in their Azure AD environments to help determine configuration weaknesses and provide advice to mitigate this risk.
CRT

  • look for non-interactive sign in for applications
  • audit trust relationships with Azure AD
  • look for new token validation tiem periods with long times

CISA's Sparrow and Open Source Hawk are also reccomended resources.

Resources

[1] FireEye SolarWinds Supply Chain Blog

[2]Splunk Blog: Sunburst Backdoor

[3]CROWDSTRIKE REPORTING TOOL FOR AZURE